

"To promote understanding and appreciation of the religious and spiritual values which abide in the processes and relationships of agriculture and rural life; to define their significance and relate them to the Christian enterprise at home and abroad."

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The National Welfare and Rural Urban Migration in the U.S.A.

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"For the better utilization of our arable land I have full faith only in the family farm, and in the family farm only in case of the family with continuity of life and occupancy of the land. And continuity of family life and of land occupancy is dependent on a philosophy of life, or if you prefer, on religious belief. . . . It is becoming clear that the land is the foundation of the family and that the family is the foundation of the State."—O.E.B.

Progress in agricultural technique and, prior to the economic depression, opportunity to find employment in urban occupations, have induced a migration, particularly of young people, from rural to urban areas in nearly all modern nations. In the United States, where the application of power to agriculture has been particularly rapid, the proportion of the gainfully employed population engaged in agriculture declined from 54 percent in 1870 (when the first good Census of occupations was taken) to 21 percent in 1930. Simultaneously production per worker in agriculture increased about two and one-half fold. During the decade 1920-1929 about 19,000,000 people left the farms and 13,000,000 returned, leaving a net migration from the farms of over 6,000,000.

The Decline in Migration from the Farms since 1930

But with the onset of the depression in 1930 the movement from the farms to the cities diminished, indeed, was even reversed in 1931 and 1932, and at present fully two million young people are backed up on farms who would, under pre-depression conditions, have migrated to the cities. As a result there has been an increase of 500,000 farms during the last five years, reversing the trend of a quarter century. Allowing 10,000,000 as the number of unemployed in the nation, it appears that nearly 28 percent of the gainfully employed are now engaged in agriculture, an increase of one-third in five years.

Instead of a declining farm population, the trend now is rapidly upward, the farm population at present being greater than ever before. Instead of the farms becoming larger, they are now, on the average, becoming smaller. Instead of increasing production per worker in agriculture there has been a decrease of probably 20 percent during the last 5 years. Part of this decrease is attributable to the drought, but part to the increasing farm population pressing upon decreasing land resources. Largely because of erosion, the land resources of the United States are being depleted rapidly; and the increasing pressure of population on the land is not likely to improve the situation relative to depletion of soil resources.

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The increase in farms, as revealed by the preliminary returns from the 1935 Census of Agriculture, has occurred mostly in the regions of poor soils or hilly surface and around the large cities, particularly the industrial cities and those near which the land is poor and cheap. Both these developments are to be expected. In the poorer agricultural regions, notably the Southern Appalachian Mountain areas, the birthrate has been and continues high, the surplus of youth not needed in agriculture is large, while education in general is poor, many migrants to the cities from such regions in the past engaging in unskilled labor. Such laborers could accumulate little capital. Consequently, as unemployment developed in 1929, 1930, and 1931, the movement of these laborers back to relatives and friends on the farms in search of shelter and sustenance has been larger than the return movement to the richer agricultural regions. In addition, it must be realized that land can be bought or rented more cheaply in these areas of poor soils, and that the unemployed generally have little or no capital. The smallest increase in farms has been in the Corn Belt, where agriculture is highly commercialized and the land is rich and costly. Evidently not many of the unemployed could obtain the use of it. Even around the cities in the Corn Belt--Chicago, Des Moines, Omaha--the increase in number of farms was small; whereas around the cities where much of the land is poor and cheap--Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Birmingham, Cincinnati, St. Louis--the increase in farms was large. Doubtless most of these new farms were small part-time or self-sufficing farms, not only around the cities but also in the mountain districts and in areas of poor soils. In some of these poverty-stricken districts, utterly unable to bear the load of a 25 to 50 percent increase in population in the 5 years, one-third to two-thirds of all the families are receiving "relief" (food, clothing, etc.) from the Federal Government.

Is the Increase in Farm Population Permanent or Transitory?

It is generally assumed that this backing up of rural youth on farms is transitory and that migration to the cities in pre-depression magnitude will be resumed with the return of prosperity. But with the passage of time this assumption seems less certain. The recent report of the very competent Committee on Unemployment appointed by the Mayor of New York City throws light on this question. This report contains the following statement:

"Granted eventual recovery of our industries to a normal level of production; assuming the ultimate passage of legislation for economic security and the continued provision of mass public employment; by what reasoning dare we conclude that direct relief, supplied in part from the Federal treasury, will no longer be necessary for considerable numbers of our people? The cards are all stacked the other way. Technological change is still going on, creating new unemployment. Many of those who have lost or are losing their jobs will not fit into the public works program because of age, sex, lack of proper skills, physical handicaps--or perhaps simply because they live where work cannot readily be made available to them. The three or four million jobs to be provided will be too few for the total need. It is only relief, 'the dole,' public assistance--call it what you will--that can meet the needs of the excluded millions. The American people, with all their dislike of relief and their wishful thinking about its discontinuance, will do well to face this prospect squarely."

The rural youth of the nation must also face this prospect squarely. Undoubtedly a large number of rural youth will find work in the cities in the future, but the work that will be available will almost certainly be, in larger proportion than in the past, in those activities which require education or training. Indeed, I am told by an official of the Federal Employment Service that there are many lines of work in which employers are seeking men, and for which the Employment Service has no men to recommend. The great surplus is in unskilled labor. It appears likely that this surplus will persist, but doubtless in somewhat diminished numbers. And many, probably most of the men who go from the farms to the cities, particularly from the South, have only unskilled labor to offer.

This raises an issue in public policy. The future population of the cities in the United States seems almost certain to be recruited in increasing proportion from the rural South. Sixty percent of the migrants from the farms during the decade 1920-1929 came from the states south of the Potomac and Ohio Rivers and including Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas. In the rural South ten adults are having fully 15 children. Should this birthrate persist, these 15 would have 22 and these 22 would have 33 children. In three generations, or a century, population would treble, were there no migration. In the large northern cities ten adults are having less than seven children. Should the birthrate fall no farther, these seven would have five children and these five would have about $3\frac{1}{2}$. In a century the population of these cities would be only about one-third as large as at present, were there no accessions from outside. Doubtless the birthrate will decline in both the rural South and the urban North, but the difference in birthrates is likely to persist in much the present magnitude, judging from past trends. A thousand people in the rural South seem likely to have about ten times as many descendants a century hence as a thousand people in the large northern cities.

Are these people of the future migrating from southern farms to be educated and prepared to do the work of the cities, or are they going to constitute a vast urban proletariat? If these migrating youth are to be educated, the cities must help, for much of the rural South cannot bear all the cost. Speaking broadly, the South, particularly the humid eastern portion, is poor in natural resources--notably in soils. For unnumbered centuries the soils, except in the alluvial river bottoms, and in the cooler mountains, have been leached of their fertility by the rains of winter as well as of summer, and the organic matter oxidized by the bacterial activity induced by the heat, until they can be made productive, from the competitive commercial standpoint, only by the use of artificial fertilizers, which are expensive. The climatic advantages possessed by the South in the production of cotton have permitted such expenditures in the past, but the outlook for an increasing demand for cotton commensurate with the increasing farm population in the Cotton Belt is not bright. Moreover, cotton picking machine may greatly reduce the need for farm labor.

Nor does it seem fair that the South should bear all the cost of educating the youth. Perhaps half these farm youth will migrate to other states. If the southern farm people bear the cost of feeding and cloth-

having only about one-fourth of the industrial wage earners--manufacturing has only held its own during the third of a century, as compared with manufacturing in the "industrial" or urban areas.

The outstanding fact in the table is the approximate maintenance of the status quo for a third of a century. The smallness of the changes that have occurred in the relative importance of the different classes of manufacturing areas is surprising. Without governmental intervention, a notable trend toward the decentralization of industry cannot, apparently, be expected.

We may, of course, be at the turning point in the location of industry, as it is now clear we were in 1930 in agriculture. Who would have guessed in 1929 that within three years the century-long trend of migration from the farms to the cities would be reversed, (perhaps only temporarily), and that within five years the farm population would reach the highest point in the nation's history, with several million youth not needed in agriculture backed up on farms, and with perhaps ten million people in the cities seeking work and unable to find it? The next five years may bring as great surprises, but this seems unlikely. It appears more likely that the nation is settling down, and again going about its business with millions unemployed. A new epoch is developing, in which it appears probable there will be less internal migration as well as less immigration from abroad than before the depression, but with the difference in birthrates between rural and urban populations persisting (though both birthrates doubtless will continue to decline), and with much, perhaps most, of the increase of population occurring in the rural areas. Can this increase in rural people find employment in other occupations than agriculture and decentralized industry?

The Commuter Movement

Although manufacturing is decentralizing very slowly, if at all, the trend in residence of persons with urban employment is notably toward the suburbs and the open country surrounding the cities. This movement is, apparently, more marked among the commercial and professional classes than among the wage earners in the factories, doubtless in part because of the shorter work day. The automobile and good roads are permitting office workers, clerks and people in service occupations in particular to live farther from their work.

The trend toward concentration of population in the cities was ameliorated even before the depression by dispersion of the population within the metropolitan areas. Several of the large cities appear to have declined in population during the depression, while their suburban areas and the surrounding country more remote probably have increased considerably in population. The increase of 25 percent, 50 percent, even 100 percent in number of farms returned in the 1935 Census over the number in 1930 in many counties adjoining the large cities indicates the importance of this trend; but no figures as to the total movement are available, except for small sample areas in several states. It is probable that the increase in farms reported from these "rurban" counties, to use Dr. Galpin's term, constitutes only a small proportion of the total number of homes that have been established recently in suburban territory.

The Population Prospect and Some of Its Implications

Nevertheless, it is doubtful if the commuter movement will become of sufficient magnitude, or will induce among the new suburban dwellers a sufficient rise in the birthrate, to solve the impending problem of a declining national population. The urban economic system appears to be pressing the vitality out of the original rural social system, with its emphasis on the family and patriotism. The youth in the suburban areas apparently tend to accept the urban rather than the rural attitudes. Even into the villages and open country far removed from urban centers, the cheaper popular magazines and the motion picture shows carry the disintegrating influences of modern urban ideals. But not until the population of the nation begins to decline is it likely that effective interest will be taken in measures to retard the decline in births. There are now about 10 percent fewer children under 10 years of age in the United States than 5 years ago. This decline will continue for at least 10 years more, for during the last 10 years there has been more than 20 percent decline in births. As I look around and note the ideals of the young people, their decisions as to things worth while, it appears probable to me that the birthrate will fall as low in the United States as it has in England, where it is only about half that of 25 years ago, or in Germany, where the decline up to 1933 was still greater. It will be impossible should this condition develop, to avoid a declining national population, and difficult to prevent the decline from becoming persistent and progressive.

The birthrate is declining most rapidly among the upper middle class in the cities. A small number of people at the peak of the economic pyramid appear to be reproducing themselves. The people in the cities at the base of the economic pyramid are still reproducing themselves, but the middle classes in the cities--the professional and business classes--are tending toward voluntary extinction. Among the farming population, however, there is no such great difference in fertility between economic classes. Tenants, it is true, generally have more children than owner-operators, and farm laborers who are married, more children than tenants, but the differences are much smaller than between economic classes in the cities. And in several Corn Belt states there is an increase in number of children as production per farm, or value of farm property, increases. Practically every student of population trends expects that the birthrate will continue to decline in the United States; the difference of opinion relates to the questions, how fast and how far. If rural youth accept the urban ideals and judgments as to things worth while, the decline may become as rapid in the country as in the cities, but from a much higher base. The outlook is for a slow increase of population for a decade or two, of which only a minor part, perhaps, may be urban, then an almost stationary population for a few years, then a decline, increasing in rapidity with the passage of time. Instead of a 16 percent increase in population, as occurred between 1920 and 1930, the prospect is for about 6 percent increase between 1930 and 1940, probably two-thirds of which has already occurred, and for a much smaller increase between 1940 and 1950.

Consumption per capita of foodstuffs, considered as a whole, is not increasing, but, rather, has declined slightly for a decade. Increased sedentary employment diminished the use of cereals in particular prior

marriages in the preceding year, many of which had been postponed during the depression, it seems almost certain, now that marriages have reached the pre-depression level, that the births will trend downward again before long. In the large cities only about two-thirds enough children are now being born to maintain population stationary without migration from rural areas or from abroad.

The nation, in other words, assuming no increase in immigration from abroad, is faced with the prospect of a stationary population after a decade or two, to be followed by a decline--unless a balance is restored between rural and urban population. Since the trend of births, both rural and urban, is downward, it will be necessary, apparently, if a declining population is to be avoided, with all its serious consequences, to have an increasing proportion of the population living in a rural environment, or else to achieve greater economic security for both rural and urban people and alter the national philosophy of life. Greater economic security should result from a better balance in the distribution of the national income between rural and urban people, and the national philosophy of life would be greatly improved, from the standpoint of assuring the survival of the nation and the race, by recognizing that the family is the foundation of the State--a recognition which the rural people have granted with reverence for centuries.

But for more than a century the urban economic system and resultant social ideals have been depressing the birthrate in the United States, and there is no evidence as yet of a permanent amelioration of this urban economic and social influence. The implication is clear that from the standpoint of the maintenance of the population of the nation a greater proportion of the people should live under the influence of a rural environment. But from the economic standpoint a decreasing proportion is needed in agriculture. The more productive half of the farmers in 1929--those that produced over \$1,000 worth of products (including the food consumed by the farm family)--contributed about 87 percent of all farm products "sold or traded," to use the Census phrase. Undoubtedly within a few years these farmers could produce all the commercial production, if prices of farm products afforded a little encouragement. In other words, half the farmers--the less productive half--are not needed to feed the cities and provide cotton and tobacco for much of the world. But it is these less productive farmers, measured by the money value of their products, who are feeding, clothing and educating (so far as their resources permit) far more than their share of the children that migrate to the cities, and the cities may soon need people as well as food.

From the present economic standpoint fewer farmers are needed, but from the standpoint of the future strength of the nation more farmers are needed, or at least more people possessing that stability and strength which is associated with the land. Will the recent rapid increase in rural population be sustained by the decentralization of industry or by the further development of the commuter movement?

Decentralization of Industry

The following table, courteously provided by Dr. Carter Goodrich and Mr. Daniel Creamer, of the Study of Population Redistribution, indicates that there has been no notable trend of manufacturing toward decentralization in recent years, except, possibly, since 1931:

Table I. Percentage Distribution of Wage Earners

By Areas of Concentration and Dispersion, United States, 1899 - 1931

(Statistics adapted from the Censuses of Manufactures)

Percent of Wage Earners (based on average for the year) employed in:

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1933	33.1	2.6	18.7	6.7	1.6	10.3	27.0
1931	35.2	2.9	18.2	6.9	1.7	9.7	25.4
1929	35.1	2.9	18.1	6.9	1.7	9.3	26.0
1919	36.1	3.6	18.6	6.3	1.6	8.3	25.5
1899	39.5	3.7	14.6	5.9	1.1	8.4	26.8

The principal cities of "industrial areas," represented by the capital letter A in the table, included nearly 40 percent of all wage earners in manufacturing in 1899, but only about 35 percent in 1929 and 1931, and only 33 percent in 1933. Other cities of over 100,000 population in "industrial areas," indicated by B in the table, also show a downward trend in relative importance, particularly between 1919 and 1929. The remaining territory in "industrial areas," indicated by the letter C, shows an upward trend in recent years. These figures indicate a general trend toward manufacturing leaving the city proper and relocating on the belt lines of railway or in other areas surrounding the city. The trend in proportion of the nation's wage earners employed in the major industrial areas as a whole has been downward since the World War--from 57.8 percent in 1899 and 58.3 percent in 1919, to about 56.1 percent in 1929 and 56.3 percent in 1931, but only 54.4 percent in 1933.

The cities of over 100,000 population outside the industrial areas, represented by the letter D, appear to have about held their own in manufacturing in recent years. The remainder of the counties in which these cities are located, represented by the letter E, have also maintained their relative importance in manufacturing; while a number of specially selected minor industrial counties, represented by F, have increased in relative importance. In the remainder of the nation, represented by C--about 2,900 out of the nearly 3,100 counties, with one-half of the total population of the nation and over 90 percent of the farm population, but

millions of youth who later contribute to the wealth of the cities, it would seem fair that the National Government should help defray the cost of their education. Every American should be provided with the opportunity for an education. The welfare of the nation requires it.

Migration to the Cities a Costly Contribution

The cost of the contribution which the farming people have made to the productivity and prosperity of cities, suburbs, and villages is greater than is commonly recognized. If it costs \$3,000 to \$2,500 (at present prices) to rear and educate the average child on American farms to the age of 15, when he may be expected to be self-supporting--and \$150 a year does not seem an excessive estimate of the cost of food, clothing, medical services, education, and all the incidental expenses--then the 6,300,000 net migration from the farms during the decade 1920 to 1930 represents a contribution of about \$14,000,000,000. This contribution is almost equal to the value of the wheat crops plus half that of the cotton crops during these years.

Nor is this all. When the farmer and his wife grow old and die, the estate is divided among the children. During the decade 1920 to 1930 about one-fifth of the farmers and their wives died, and their estates were distributed among the children. One-third to one-half of the children had moved to town, and those children who remained on the farm had to mortgage the farm in many cases to pay the brothers and sisters who lived in the cities their share of the estate. A rough estimate indicates that between \$3,000,000,000 and \$4,000,000,000 was drained from the farms to the cities and villages during the decade 1920 to 1930 incident to the settlement of estates.

Although it is not intended to draw up a balance sheet of rural-urban contributions, it is worthy of mention in passing, that there are great movements of farm wealth to the cities in addition to those incident to migration. Interest on debt paid to persons other than farm operators amounted to about \$7,500,000,000 during the decade 1920 to 1929, and rent paid to persons other than farm operators amounted to about \$10,500,000,000.* Payments are of a different character from the movement of wealth incident to migration, but there can be no doubt that portions of these payments were for the use of capital that had been previously transferred to the cities as a consequence of migration. The total of these interest and rent items is only a little greater than that represented in migration, including the wealth that flowed to the cities in the settlement of estates. The total transfer from these four sources appears to have been about \$35,000,000,000 during the decade, or \$3,500,000,000 a year, which was about one-third of the average annual gross income of all farmers during the decade.

One more item. A study of estates, made several years ago by the Federal Trade Commission, indicated that the possession of urban wealth is probably four times more concentrated than that of rural wealth.** If the people of the nation lived on farms and in villages and small cities, there would, almost certainly, be a more equitable distribution of the national income, and, in my opinion, a greater aggregate purchasing power.

The Impoverishment of the Rural People

The trend since 1920 has been toward the impoverishment of the rural people in America. Now the rural people are suffering, perhaps as severely, if the millions of unemployed are included. Injustice, doubtless in many cases unrecognized, has borne its fruit. Rural and urban peoples ultimately rise or fall together, though for a few years one may seem to gain at the expense of the other. The National Government, it would appear, must determine the balance. This balance is affected not only by the prices of foods and raw materials relative to manufactured goods all along the route to the consumer, but also by the migration of youth, by the care of the aged, by the cost of education, and of all those institutions that influence the rise and fall of nations. Our civilization of the United States, with its efficient capitalistic system of production, has grown out of a rural civilization having a family system of production, and has derived from this rural system no small part of its sustenance and strength. The decline of the rural family in its standard of living, in its integrity, in its family ties, and in the education of its children will profoundly affect the prosperity of the cities, as well as the national welfare, and must be avoided.

The Dilemma

If migration from the farms is not resumed in considerable numbers, the National Government, it would seem, must continue to feed and clothe millions of rural people in the poorer agricultural sections of the country where population is increasing rapidly. In many counties of the mountain South the standard of living is low. A large proportion of the people appears to be little, if any, higher than in parts of China. On the other hand, if migration to the cities is resumed in great numbers, it will tend only to hasten the decline in the standard of living of the rural population, for the proportion of the population having a low birthrate will increase, while that having a high birthrate will decrease. A declining national population will tend to depress the prices of farm products. Is there no solution to this dilemma?

Rural-Urban Population Balance

In 1930 rural surplus and urban deficit in births, relative to the number needed to maintain population permanently stationary, about balanced; that is, there were enough children born to maintain the population of the nation in that year. Since 1930 the number of births has declined fully 10 percent, and although there was a slight rise in 1934, and another slight rise may be expected in 1935, because of the increase in

*Crops and Markets of Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Nov. 1932, p.440; and July 1927, p. 254.
**Federal Trade Commission. National Wealth and Income. Senate Document No. 126, May 1926, p. 60.

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to the depression. The prospect for any great increase in experts of farm products is not bright. Comm agriculture, therefore, faces the prospect of an almost stationary demand for farm products for a while, followed by a decline. Already the consumption of milk is declining, in part doubtless because of the decline of children, whose consumption per capita is larger than that of adults. The demand for eggs, likewise, soon become stationary. Of cereals and meats, however, which are, apparently, consumed more heavily by the demand may increase for several decades. But if prosperity returns and city people produce more, farmers should get more for their products. Prices of farm products in the United States, in my opinion depend for some years to come largely on the productivity of the non-farm people. Later they are likely affected in increasing degree by the decline in population; and the rate of this decline in population will depend largely upon the ideals of youth, particularly of the rural youth.

The Outlook for Rural Youth in the United States

What does the 500,000 increase in number of farms and the 10,000,000 unemployed in the cities, 5,000,000 of whom are becoming unemployable, mean for rural youth? What does the none too bright prospect of any great decentralization of industry, but in all likelihood continued development of the commuter movement and increase of part-time farms mean? What does the almost stationary population in the cities, with no increase of farm population, particularly in regions of hilly surface or poor soils, and a migration from farms perhaps only half as large as in the years before the depression, mean? These trends probably mean, first, an almost stationary and later decreasing commercial demand and increasing non-commercial consumption of farm products. They mean, secondly, a continued increase, probably, in number of farms and decrease in acreage per farm and in agricultural production per worker. They mean, thirdly, a lower standard of living for many farmers, unless these farmers produce themselves more of the things they have been accustomed to buy. Unless a planned national program of agricultural production is widely accepted. It has been difficult enough in the past for a young man to climb the ladder from a hired man to tenant to owner of a farm, and it may be more difficult in the future because of the pressure of rural young people on the land. If the rural youth are unable to find work in the cities, they must work the land. They will work cheaply, and they will necessarily try to get as much as possible out of the land, unless it is given to them through inheritance. They can start, so to speak, at the top of the economic ladder.

Inheritance as the Opportunity for Rural Youth

Last summer I attended a conference of agricultural economists in Germany, and for a week before and a week after the conference our German hosts arranged for us to visit German farms. At almost every farm we were provided with a page or two of mimeographed information about the farm. Most of the mimeographed information told of the acreage of the crops, yield per acre, fertilizer used, crop rotations, number of horses, cattle, milk cows, swine, chickens, etc., but always at the top of the page for those farms which could claim honor, and most of them could, was a statement somewhat as follows: "This farm has been in the family for 100 years." Some farms had been in the family since the eleventh century. As I considered what had happened during these centuries--wars, economic crises, periods of inflation and deflation, political revolution and change of thought came to me, how many times would this family have lost its wealth had it been invested in anything but land. In the United States it has often been said that almost every farm is for sale and the average period of occupancy is only a comparatively few years; much longer for owner-operators, however, than for tenants. But in Germany, I was delighted to find that, in general, the farm is considered a heritage from past, an "Erbhof" or hereditary home, to be passed on from father to son for as long as the family line remains intact. In southern Germany the farms, I was told, are frequently divided among the children, as in the United States, one son usually buying out the others and getting into debt to do so; but in northern Germany it is customary, in order to avoid debt or too small farms, to pass on the farm to one child, frequently the eldest son, the other children having gone to the city to make their fortunes. All the children had the right to turn to the farm in time of distress for shelter and sustenance.

In considering the problems of conserving the soil resources of the United States, the problems of land utilization, and, more recently, the problems of agricultural prosperity and of opportunity for youth, we have come to the conclusion that there is no substitute for the institution of the family. The government must buy some of the land that is eroding, or land that has eroded badly, or is otherwise too poor to support a family in a decent manner, and convert this land into forest or grazing reserves. This should be done before millions of acres of land before it washes down into the rivers, causing ever greater floods and devastation. Fortunately, a start is now being made by the Resettlement Administration. But a much larger acreage of land must be used to grow crops, and the only general alternatives to the family farm are corporation farms and government farms. Few corporation farms have survived the depression in the United States, and state socialism in Russia appears to be resulting in more weeds and worse erosion than peasant farming.

For the better utilization of our arable land I have full faith only in the family farm, and in the family farm only in the case of the family with continuity of life and occupancy of the land. And continuity of family life and of land occupancy is dependent on a philosophy of life, or, if you prefer, on religion. There will not be, I fear, much better utilization of farm land in the United States until more farms are passed on to their sons, and these sons continue to operate the farms, expecting, in turn, to pass the farms on to their sons. The rapid decline in the birthrate associated with the urbanization of the people suggests strongly that land and life are closely related. It is becoming clear that the land is the foundation of the family and that the family is the foundation of the State.